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COMMENTS 
The Expanding Constitutional Protection for the 
News Media from Liability for Defamation: 
Predictability and the New Synthesis 
The tort of defamation has a long and complex history dating 
back to the sixteenth century.1 Though this tort from the very 
beginning did not find favor with the law courts,2 it has managed 
to survive into the second half of the twentieth century. But this 
survival may not endure much longer since the Supreme Court has 
found a deep conflict benveen the law of defamation and the first 
amendment.3 The reasons for this conflict and the Supreme Court's 
basic resolution of it in favor of first amendment values -have been 
the subject of much scholarly comment,4 but the Court's· recent 
decisions require further exploration of the complex synthesis worked 
out by New York Times Co. v. Sullivan5 and its progeny. 
In the 1970 term the Supreme Court decided four cases dealing 
with the impact of the first amendment on common law libel: 
Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy,6 Time, Inc. v. Pape,7 Ocala Star-Banner 
v. Damron,8 and Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc.9 While each of 
these cases contributes to the developing doctrine of New York Times, 
the most significant is Rosenbloom since it marks a basic shift from 
a privilege protecting comment on public officials and pubHc figures 
1. w. PROSSER, THE I.Aw OF TORTS § 111, at 737 (4th ed. 1971). 
2. Lovell, The Reception of Defamation by the Common Law, 15 VAND. L. REv. 
~IQ%~ . 
3. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) and cases listed in notes 
25·32 and text accompanying notes 6-9 infra. 
4. See, e.g., Cohen, Lt New Niche for the Fault Principle: A Forthcoming News.· 
worthiness Privilege in Libel Cases?, 18 UCLA L. REv. 371 (1970); Kalven, The Rea-, 
sonable Man and the First Amendment: Hill, Butts, and Walker, 1967 SUP. Cr. R.Ev. 
267; Nimmer, The Right To Speak from Times to Time: First Amendment Theory 
Applied to Libel and Misapplied to Privacy, 56 CALIF. L. REv. 935 (1968); Pedrick, 
Freedom of the Press and the Law of Libel: The Modern Revised Translation, 49 
CoRNELL L.Q. 581 (1964); Note, Free Speech and Defamation of Public Persons: The 
Expanding Doctrine of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 52 CoRNELL L.Q. 419 (1967); 
Note, The Constitutional Law of Defamation and Privacy: Butts and Walker, 53 
CoRNELL L. R.Ev. 649 (1968); Note, Public Official and Actual Malice Standards: The 
Evolution of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 56 IOWA L. REv. 393 {1970);• Note, 
The New York Times Rule: An Analysis of Its Application, 55 MINN. L. REv. 299 
(1970); Note, First Amendment Requires Qualified Privilege To Publish Defamatory 
Misstatements A.bout Public Officials, 113 U. PA. L. REv. 284 (1964); Note, The Scope· 
of First Amendment Protection for Good Faith Defamatory Error, 75 YALE L.J. 642 
(1966). Cf. T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 517-62 (1970). 
5. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
6. 401 U.S. 265 (1971). 
7. 401 U.S. 279 (1971). 
8. 401 U.S. 295 (1971). 
9. 403 U.S. 29 (1971). 
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to one sheltering publication of all matters of public interest. In 
addition, the dissenting opinions in Rosenbloom present an entirely 
new method for balancing the interest in reputation with first amend-
ment values.10 
J. BACKGROUND FOR THE 1970 TERM 
Under traditional common law doctrine,11 the plaintiff's prima 
fade case in an action of libel was made by establishing the defen-
dant's publication of a statement, defamatory of and concerning the 
plaintiff, and so understood by a person to whom the communication 
was made.12 The burden was then on the defendant to prove that the 
statement was true or that it was privileged.13 Though the Supreme 
Court has dealt with the elements of the common law prima facie 
case,14 the thrust of recent constitutional doctrine concerns the de-
fense of privilege.15 
At common law there were two broad categories of privilege: 
absolute and conditional.16 An absolute privilege meant that the 
defendant publisher was completely excused from any liability re-
gardless of his motives in publishing.11 Such a privilege, however, 
was limited to very few circumstances, none of which were applicable 
to the usual dissemination of news by the mass communications 
media.18 The media;however, could make use of at least two of the 
10. 403 U.S. at 62, 78 (1971) (Harlan, J., and Marshall, J., dissenting). 
11. For a much fuller discussion of the entire law of defammation, see Vv. PROSSER, 
supra note I, §§ 111-16. 
12. llEsTATEMENT OF TORTS § 613 (1938). 
13. W. PROSSER, supra note I, § 114, at 776. 
14. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 288 (1964); Rosenblatt v. Daer, 
383 U.S. 75, 80-83 (1966) (content of the "of-and-concerning" requirement); Greenbelt 
Cooperative Publishing Assn. v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6, 11 (1970) (whether "blackmail" is 
defamatory in context in which it 1vas used). 
15. See, e'.g., Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 43-45 (1971): Curtis 
Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 155 (1967); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 
376 U.S. 254, 279-83 (1964). 
16. W. PROSSER, supra note I, §§ 114-15, at 776, 785 • 
. , _17. Veeder, .llbsolute Immunity in Defamation: Legislative and Executive Proceed• 
ings, 10 CoLUM. L REv~ 130 (1909). 
18. Absolute privilege was granted to statements made by judges when acting in 
a judicial capacity, see, e.g., Ginger v. Bowles, 369 Mich. 680, 120 N.W.2d 842 (1963), 
cert. denied, 380 U.S. 986 (1965); Irwin v. Ashurst, 158 Ore. 61, 74 P.2d 1127 (1938); 
statements made by legislators in the course of any of their functions, see, e.g., Coffin v. 
Coffin, 4 Mass. I (1808); statements made by certain executive officers in the discharge 
of their duties, see, e.g., Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564 (1959); Spauding v. Vilas, 161 U.S. 
483 (1896); statements where the plaintiff has consented to the defamation, see, e.g., 
Taylor v. McDaniels, 139 Okla. 262, 281 P. 967 (1929); statements made between a 
husband and wife, see, e.g., Campbell v. Bannister, 79 Ky. 205 (1880). Broadcasters arc, 
however, given an absolute privilege protecting them from libel liability for statements 
made in political broadcasts required by law. Farmers Educ. &: Co-operative Union of 
America v. WDAY, Inc., 360 U.S. 525 (1959). See generally W. PROSSER, supra note 1, 
§ 114, at 777-85. 
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conditional privileges: (1) fair comment on matters of public con:. 
cern, and (2) reports of public proceedings.19 Publications within 
either category did not entail liability for defamation if they were 
made in a reasonable manner and for a proper purpose.20 
The privilege of fair comment was interpreted in different,ways 
by the state courts. The majority position restricted it to false or 
misleading commentary based on true propositions of fact.21 As a 
general rule such statements were protected from liability provided 
they were not shown to be made with malice;22 but liability did re-
sult if false statements of fact were made or the comment was based 
on erroneous factual propositions.23 The minority position was 
that even false statements of fact concerning the qualifications of 
public officers or candidates for public office were privileged, 
provided they were not published with m'alice.24 
The constitutional development begins precisely at this point 
with the Supreme Court's incorporation of the essence of the minor~ 
ity position in New York Times. In this case the Court held that•the 
first and fourteenth amendments forbid "a public official from recov-
ering damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official 
conduct unless ·he proves that the statement was made with 'actual 
malice' -that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless 
disregard of whether it was false or not."25 This constitutional re-
quirement was soon applied to criminal libel,26 and in Curtis Pub-
lishing Co. v. Butts,27 the Court extended the privilege to. commeri~ 
on matters of public interest .concerning public figures.28 In other 
19. See, e.g., Lulay v. Peoria Journal-Star, lnc., 34 Ill. 2d 112, 214 N.E.2d 746. ,(1966)_; 
Yancey v. Gillespie, 242 N.C. 227, 87 S,E.2d 210 (1955); _Morgan v. Bul1etin Co., 369 Pa. 
349, 85 A,2d 869 (1952); Hoeppner v. Dunkirk Printing Co., 254 N.Y. 95, 172 N.E. 139 
(1930). , , , 
20. W. PROSSER, supra note 1, § 115, at 786. · 
21. Note, Fair Comment, 62 HARV. L. REv. 1207, 1211 (1949). 
22. Id. at 1215. For an explanation of the common law usage of this term, see 
W. PROSSER, supra note 1, § 118, at 823-30. · ' · 
23. Note, supra note 21, at 1211-12. . . 
24. See, e.g., Coleman y. MacLennon, 78 Kan. 711, 723, 98 P. 281, 285 0908). 
25, 376 U.S. at 279-80. 
26. Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 (1964). 
27. 388 U.S. 130 (1967). 
28. In Butts, Justices Harlan, Clark, Fortas and Stewart voted to 'apply a standard 
that would grant recovery even though a public figure was involved if tµe plaintiff 
could show that the publisher engaged in "highly unreasonable conduct constituting 
an extreme departure from the standards of investigation and reporting ordinarily 
adhered to by responsible publishers." 388 U.S. at 155. These justices found highly 
unreasonable conduct present in the Saturday Evening Post article on a betting 
scandal involving the athletic director of the Unive~sity of Georgia, but not in the 
companion case, Associated Press v. Walker, 388 U.S. 130 (1967), concerning the 
Associated Press dispatch on General Walker's behavior at the University of Mississippi 
during the integration crisis there. Chief Justice Warren applied the New York Times 
malice test and found malice present in· the Post article, but not in the Associated 
Press dispatch. 388 U.S. at 165-66. Justices Brennan and White also applied the New 
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decisions the Court more precisely delineated the meaning of the 
standards first enunciated in New York Times. A test was developed 
for ascertaining who was a "public official" within the meaning of 
New York 'Times: "those among the hierarchy of government em-
ployees who have, or appear to the public to have, substantial respon-
sibility for or control over the conduct of governmental affairs."20 
Moreover, a line of decisions further defined the malice standard of 
New York Times. The Court initially determined that "reckless 
disregard of the truth" meant false statements made with a high 
degree of awareness of their probable falsity.30 Subsequent cases 
found jury instructions that spoke of malice in terms of personal 
spite or ill will to be constitutionally deficient under this standard.31 
Finally, the Court held that reckless conduct was not measured by 
whether a reasonably prudent man would have published or would 
have investigated before publishing; rather, the evidence must show 
that the defendant in fact entertained serious doubts as to the truth 
of his statement.32 
In sum, the state of libel law prior to the 1970 term was that 
public- officials and public figures generally could not recover for 
defamation unless they could show that the statement was published 
York Times malice test, but found no malice present in either case. 388 U.S. at 172-73, 
Justices Black and Douglas concurred in the application of the malice standard, but 
maintained the views they had expressed in New York Times that the media should 
not be deprived of the privilege to comment on public affairs even if they published 
material knowing it was false. 388 U.S. at 170-71. 
The question of who is or is not a public figure has not been fully resolved by the 
Supreme Court. In Butts, Justice Harlan spoke of Butts and Walker as commanding "a 
substantial amount of independent public interest" at the time of publication. 388 U.S. 
at 154. Justice Harlan thought that Butts may have attained the status of public figure 
by virtue of his position as athletic director of the University of Georgia and that 
Walker was a public figure by virtue of his own purposeful activity "amounting to a 
thrusting of his personality into the 'vortex' of an important public controversy." 388 
U.S. at 155. In addition to commanding sufficient continuing public interest, both had 
"sufficient access to the means of counter-argument to be able 'to expose through discus• 
sion the falsehood and fallacies' of the defamatory statements." 388 U.S. at 155. Lower 
court cases interpreting Butts have found a variety of persons to be public figures. See, 
e.g., Tilton v. Cowles Publishing Co., 76 Wash. 2d 707, 459 P.2d 8 (1969), cert. denied, 
399 U.S. 927 (1970) {policemen and firemen who stood for election to the Spokane 
Area Public Safety Council); Grayson v. Curtis Publishing Co., 72 Wash. 2d 999, 
436 P .2d 756 (1967) (the head basketball coach at the University of Washington); 
Rose v. Koch, 278 Minn. 235, 154 N.W.2d 409 (1967) {a sociology professor with an 
international reputation as an author and lecturer and who was formerly a state 
legislator); Lloyds v. United Press Intl., Inc., 63 Misc. 2d 421, 311 N.Y.S.2d 373 (Sup. Ct. 
1970) (the foremost trainer of standard bred horses); Arber v. Stahlin, 10 Mich. App. 181, 
159 N.W.2d 154 (1968), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 924 (1970) (Republican Party workers 
and precinct delegates). 
29. Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 85 (1966). 
. '30. Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74 (1964). 
31. Henry v. Collins, 380 U.S. 356 (1965); Beckley Newspapers Corp. v. Hanks, 
389 U.S. 81 (1967). More recent Court thinking is still consistent on this point. Greenbelt 
Cooperative Publishing Assn. v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6 (1970). 
82. St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731 (1968). 
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with knowledge that it was false or with a high degree of awareness 
of probable falsity. Purely private citizens were not required to make 
such a showing in order to establish their case. 
II. MONITOR PATRIOT, OCALA STAR-BANNER, AND TIME, INC. V. PAPE 
In its initial decisions in the 1970 term, the Court continued to 
clarify the scope of the constitutional protection afforded the media 
by New York Times. In Monitor Patriot and Ocala Star-Banner 
juries awarded the respondents, who were candidates for public 
office, damages for libel against the petitioner-newspapers. The 
lvionitor Patriot published a syndicated column characterizing re-
spondent Roy as a "former small-time bootlegger."33 The Ocala 
Star-Banner reported that respondent Damron had been charged 
with perjury in a federal court.34 
Both plaintiffs, even as candidates, were clearly public officials 
within the meaning .of New York Times,35 but both argued· that 
the statements did not relate to official conduct. and therefore were 
not constitutionally privileged.36 Roy further argued that whether 
a statement related to official conduct or to private matter.s was a 
question of fact for the jury.37 
The Supreme Court rejected these claims. It held: first, that 
the proper standard for assessing whether a publication about a 
candidate is privileged is whether that publication asserts "anything 
which might touch on an official's fitness for office";38 second~ th~t a 
"charge of criminal conduct, no matter how remote in time or place, 
can never be irrelevant to an official's or a candidate's· fitness for-
office."30 
33. 401 U.S. at 266. 
34. 401 U.S. at 296. 
35. 401 U.S. at 271, 299. 
36. 401 U.S. at 273, 300. 
37. 401 U.S. at 275-77. 
38. 401 U.S. at 274. This holding is an application to candidates of the test of rele-
vance developed for public officials in Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 77 (1964). ' 
39. 401 U.S. at 277. Justice White concurred in both cases, but wrote a separate 
opinion simply to remind the public that false statements have no value in themselves 
but are protected, if innocent, simply to ensure access to the truth. 401 U.S. at 301. 
Justice Black wrote an opinion joined by Justice Douglas that concurred in the judg• 
ment for the same reasons set out in earlier concurrences, but dissented from the 
remand since the press should be absolutely privileged to report matters of public 
concern. 401 U.S. at 278. This opinion applied also to Time, Inc. v. Pape, 401 U.S. 279 
(1971). 
The view of Justices Black and Douglas is that the media should be absolutely 
privileged to publish matters of public concern. When a matter of public interest is 
involved, even knowledge that the published material is false will not defeat this 
privilege. Nevertheless, absent subscription to this view by a majority of the Court, 
Justices Black and Douglas would concur in the opinion granting the media the most 
protection. See Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 57 (1971); Greenbelt 
Cooperative Publishing Assn. v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6, 24 (1970); St. Amant v. Thompson, 
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It might be questioned whether all allegations of past criminal 
conduct are indeed relevant to one's fitness for public office. For 
example, certain consensual sexual acts between husband and wife 
constitute sodomy, a felony in the state of Michigan;40 but it is argu-
able that one's sexual preferences with a spouse are not relevant 
to one's ability to hold public office effectively. Yet, even if there 
are;! charges of criminal conduct that may not be relevant to fitness, 
an all-inclusive rule is desirable. Such irrelevant charges would be 
extremely rare,41 while the cost in media self-censorship without an 
all-inclusive rule would be comparatively high. 
The focus of such a rule is not to protect publication of libelous 
material unconnected with fitness for office, but rather to encourage 
the media not to suppress relevant allegations of past criminal con-
duct. The all-inclusive rule fosters open commentary since it elimi-
nates the fear of damage judgments for guessing incorrectly about 
whether a particular allegation is relevant. At the same time, the 
requirement that the matter be published without malice restrains 
the media from engaging in a campaign to libel any candidate. 
Thus, the position is consistent with the underlying rationale of 
New York Times: a certain amount of "breathing space" from fear 
of damage judgments for libel is necessary if the media is to perform 
its historic role of keeping citizens informed on matters of public 
importance.42 
Wnen charges of past criminal conduct are involved, the problem 
of fear of publishing irrelevant material is particularly acute. Absent 
an all-inclusive rule, there would probably be self-censorship regard-
ing such charges, for even if irrelevant to fitness for office they would 
be likely to cause serious harm to one's reputation and hence to result 
in costly judgments. The all-inclusive rule would be helpful in pre-
venting such self-censorship. 
The Court's concern with maintaining the media as the catalyst 
of robust public debate was further evidenced by the argumentation 
underlying the narrow holding of these cases. In Monitor Patriot 
Justice Stewart reasoned that it was inconsistent with first amendment 
freedoms to allow a jury using the preponderance of the evidence 
standard to impose liability for libel on the media for publishing a 
390 U.S. 727, 733-34 (1968); Beckley Newspapers Corp. v. Hanks, 389 U.S. 81, 85 (1967); 
Curtis l'ublishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 170-72 (1967); Rosenblatt v. Daer, 383 U,S, 
75, 88-91, 94-96 (1966): Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 79-88 (1964); New York 
Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 293-97 (1964). 
40. MICH. COMP. LAws .ANN. § 750.158 (1968). 
41. It is suggested that to be irrelevant, the charge must be of a crime that is not 
malum in se, and that is such that the person charged did not know and could not be 
expected to know his behavior was illegal. Othenvise, whatever one's thought about the 
intrinsic harm of the offense, the very disobedience to a law one knew or should have 
known about would indicate an attitude toward the law that would be relevant to a 
candidate's or public official's fitness. 
42. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 271-72 (1964), 
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"political speech."43 The focus of such a jury decision is on the con-
tent of the speech. Therefore, if the content was particularly un-. 
popular and plausibly could relate to the candidate's private life 
rather than his public life, the jury might be likely to find the state-
ment irrelevant to the candidate's fitness for office and award damages 
for defamation. 
The Court's solution to this sort of jury discretion when allega-
tions of past criminal conduct are involved was to rule that all such 
statements are relevant to fitness for office as a matter of constitu-
tional law. It is still an open question whether the jury using the 
preponderance of the evidence standard should be allowed to decide 
the relevance of other types of statements to a candidate's fitness for 
office. Justice Stewart's strong language in Monitor Patriot indicates 
that the jury should not be allowed to decide such questions using 
this standard.44 If this is so, two other decision mechanisms are pos-
sible: (1) the court must decide all questions of relevance as a matter 
of law; or (2) the jury must decide these questions of relevance using 
a higher standard of the burden of proof-for example, a "clear and 
convincing evidence" or "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard. 
Because the critical value for the Supreme Court in libel cases 
is providing the media with sufficient "breathing space" to publish 
matters of public interest, a crucial factor in evaluating any decision 
maker is the predictability with which it renders a particular type 
of decision. In this perspective, a court is superior to a jury that uses 
a preponderance of the evidence standard. As questions of relevance 
proceed through appellate litigation, there will be a growing body of 
case law regarding certain types of statements, which courts will feel 
bound by stare decisis to follow. The media could often know in 
advance of publication whether a particular type of statement had 
been held to be relevant to fitness in the past, and hence could 
publish the material with a greatly diminished fear of a damage 
judgment. 
It could be argued that the weight of stare decisis would produce 
negligible increments of predictability in the short run: one or two 
decisions that a particular type of statement is relevant to fitness for 
office will serve as weak precedent, especially outside of the jurisdic-
tions where rendered. Moreover, it will be unusual for the Supreme 
Court to decide that a particular type of statement is always relevant, 
as it did in Monitor Patriot and Ocala Star-Banner.45 And even if it 
were not unusual, such decisions would take considerable time.46 
But this argument fails to perceive that however negligible the 
43. 401 U.S. at 276. 
44. 401 U.S. at 275-77. 
45. This follows from the case-by-case approach often employed by the Court. See 
Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 44 n.12 (1971). 
46. It took over ten years from the date of publication for Monitor Patriot to be 
decided by the Supreme Court, and almost five years for the Ocala Star-Banner decision. 
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added predictability of a court as decision maker, it is nonetheless 
real. In contrast, no such increase in certitude regarding particular 
types of statements is possible if a jury is making the decision using 
the preponderance of the evidence standard since one jury's decision 
would not be binding on the next, even as to an identical factual 
setting. 
Even when no cases have dealt with a particular issue, the slow 
turnover in judges may allow some projections, from knowledge of 
particular judges' idiosyncracies or biases, about what decision would 
be rendered in a given locality regarding a particular statement. On 
the other hand, individual quirks of juries would be impossible to 
predict at the time of publication. 
There is a second type of predictability that is also important for 
ascertaining the most desirable decision maker: even if one could 
not predict that any particular statement would result in liability, it 
might be possible to predict, for example, that ninety-five per cent 
of questionable statements will be resolved in one's favor. Therefore, 
knowledge that a decision maker is generally receptive to a vigorous 
press will minimize self-censorship. It is not certain that a court 
is superior to a jury in this regard since any satisfactory answer 
would depend on empirical data not currently available. But there 
is sound reason to think that a court would find the great percent-
age of statements relevant to fitness, given the language of Monitor 
Patriot and the weight that must be accorded a position of the Su-
preme Court in our judicial structure. No such claim can be made 
for jury decisions employing the preponderance of the evidence stan-
dard. 
Assuming that these arguments are persuasive, they do not imply 
that a court as decision maker would be superior to the second 
position noted above-a jury using a clear and convincing evidence 
standard or a beyond a reasonable doubt standard. Such a position 
is consistent with Monitor Patriot,47 and it is intuitively clear that 
such a standard would allow the media more breathing space than 
the preponderance of the evidence standard. The crucial question is 
whether this added protection of robust public debate would be the 
equivalent of, or superior to, the protection afforded by a court 
as decision maker. No comparison is possible regarding the second 
type of predictability absent empirical data on the types of decisions 
that a judge, or a jury using the higher standard of proof, would 
make in similar circumstances. But there is substantial reason to 
think a court superior on the first type of predictability since the 
same advantages discussed above for favoring the court over the jury 
as decision maker apply irrespective of the standard used by the jury. 
A-court's decision still has a stare decisis effect while a jury's does 
47. See 401 U.S. at Z75-76. 
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not, and the value orientations of trial and appellate judges are more 
predictable than those of juries. 
The third libel case of the 1970 term, Time, Inc. v. Pape,48 con-
cerned the publication by Time Magazine of an article about police 
brutality in America based upon the 1961 Civil Rights Commission 
Report.49 The Report described an early morning police raid led by 
Deputy Chief of Detectives Pape of the Chicago police. The raid re-
sulted in a suit against Pape by the Monroes, whose home was in-
vaded, for damages for violation of the Federal Civil Rights Act.50 
The Report detailed the allegations in the Monroes' complaint, 
whereas Time stated that the Report said the incidents actually took 
place.51 Pape subsequently sued Time for libel. At trial Time's re-
searcher admitted she was consciously aware that the Time article 
did not relate that its statements were assertions in a complaint.52 
The district court granted Time's motion for a directed verdict,53 
but the court of appeals reversed, holding that it was a jury question 
whether this conscious alteration showed actual malice.54 The Su-
preme Court reversed the court of appeals and held that the omission 
"amounted to the adoption of one of a number of possible rational 
interpretations of a document that bristled with ambiguities,"55 and 
that the deliberate choice of such an interpretation did not create a 
jury issue of New York Times malice.56 In essence, the decision pro-
vides the media with the same level of protection in relating other's 
direct reports of events that they have when reporting events directly 
themselves since such secondhand reporting constitutes a substantial 
part of the news gathering and reporting business.57 If any knowing 
alteration of another's direct report were equivalent to falsification, 
the media publishing the secondhand report could avoid the risk of 
liability for defamation only by reprinting the direct report verbatim 
or by not publishing it at all. But the Court made it explicit that 
mere conscious alteration of the wording of another's direct report 
does not amount to knowledge that what one is saying is false since 
complex reports are open to a wide variety of arguably reasonable 
48. 401 U.S. 279 (1971). 
49. It was based specifically on volume five of that report, entitled Justice. 401 U.S. 
at 280. 
50. 42 u.s.c. § 1983 (1970). 
51. 401 U.S. at 282. 
52. 401 U.S. at 283. 
53. 294 F. Supp. 1087 (N.D. III. 1969). 
54. 419 F.2d 980 (7th Cir. 1969). 
55. 401 U.S. at 290. 
56. 401 U.S. at 290. Justice Harlan dissented on the ground that the court of 
appeals had properly defined the quality of proof required by New York Times and 
that it had applied the correct standard of review in passing upon the trial court's 
decision to grant a directed verdict. 401 U,S, at 294. 
57. 401 U.S. at 285-86. 
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interpretations.58 Nor does it amount to a high degree of awareness 
that what one is saying is probably false when there is uncontroverted 
testimony that the publisher believed he was faithful to the real 
meaning of the firsthand report. rm 
Though the decision arose in the context of a reversal of an ap-
pellate court's application of the malice test,60 the primary lesson is 
for the trial court. It must determine in the first instance whether 
the second report is a plausible interpretation of the first. The paral-
lel question in the case of direct reports is whether the report is a 
faithful presentation of the facts. The only difference is that the de-
termination of plausibility is a more sophisticated inquiry. If the 
court has before it all the relevant facts in the case of a direct report, 
it can compare the facts to the assertions made and, as a general rule, 
draw a quick conclusion regarding falsity. The difficulty lies in mar• 
shalling all the facts.61 In the case of presentation of another's direct 
report, there is no difficulty in obtaining all the relevant data; the 
t\vo texts are all that there is. But drawing the inference that the sec-
ond conforms with the first may be most difficult. 62 There is a coun-
ter-factor, however, since once implausibility is shown, there should 
be less difficulty showing that there is a jury issue regarding knowl-
edge or reckless disregard of the tmth than in the case of direct 
reports because most cases of secondhand reports will involve con-
scious alteration of the direct report.63 Thus, Time, Inc. v. Pape is an 
interesting variation of the New York Times malice test, but it does 
not involve any radical departure from the previous cases. It is the 
logical consequence of New York Times for this sort of case. 
Ill. ROSENBLOOM V. METROMEDIA, INC. 
Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, lnc.64 augmented the protection af• 
forded the media in the previous cases by shifting the focus of the 
privilege from the person who was defamed to the subject matter of 
the statement published. In early October 1963, the Special Inves-
tigations Squad of the Philadelphia Police Department initiated a 
series of raids in order to enforce the obscenity laws of the City of 
Philadelphia. The crackdown was primarily directed at newsstand 
58. 401 U.S. at 290. 
59. 401 U.S. at 292. 
60. 401 U.S. at 283. 
61. See, e.g., Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265 (1971). It might involve 
considerable testimony to establish that Mr. Roy was a former bootlegger, particularly 
since prohibition ended some thirty years before the publication and subsequent trial. 
62. 401 U.S. at 286. 
63. There is, of course, the additional pos~ibility of typographical or other non• 
conscious error. 
64. 403 U.S. 29 (1971). 
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operators. vVhile the police were making an arrest at a newsstand, 
George Rosenbloom, a distributor of nudist magazines, arrived to 
deliver some of his magazines and was also arrested. The police then 
obtained a warrant and searched Rosenbloom's home and warehouse, 
where they seized a large inventory of books and magazines. Radio 
station WIP broadcast a series of short newscasts concerning this raid, 
the first two of which characterized the confiscated material as "ob-
scene"0u rather than as "reportedly obscene."66 Rosenbloom soon 
thereafter brought suit in federal district court to enjoin police in-
terference with his business and further publicity regarding his ear-
lier arrests. Again WIP aired a series of brief newscasts about the 
suit.67 
In May 1964, Rosenbloom was acquitted of criminal obscenity 
charges. Subsequently, he brought a libel suit against WIP in federal 
district court on the basis of diversity of citizenship. The suit rested 
on the nvo broadcasts that did not use the word "reportedly" before 
the word "obscene,"68 and on the characterization, in the second 
series of broadcasts, of Rosenbloom and his business associates as 
"girlie-book peddlers" and of his suit for injunction as an attempt 
to force the police and the news media to "lay off the smut literature 
racket,"69 WIP defended on the grounds of truth and privilege._70 
The jury returned a verdict for 25,000 dollars in general damages 
and 725,000 dollars in punitive damages; the latter was reduced to 
250,000 dollars on remittitur. The district court, in denying defen-
dant's motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict, held that 
65. The initial 6 p.m. broadcast on Oct. 4, 1963, was as follows: 
City cracks down on smut merchants. 
The Special Investigations Squad raided the home of George Rosenbloom in 
the 1800 block of Vesta Street this afternoon. Police confiscated 1,000 allegedly 
obscene books at Rosenbloom's home and arrested him on charges of possession 
of obscene literature. The Special Investigations Squad also raided a barn in the 
20 hundred block of Welsh Road near Bustleton Avenue and confiscated 3,000 
obscene books. Capt. Ferguson says he believes they have hit the supply of a main 
distributor of obscene material in Philadelphia. 
403 U.S. at 33 (1971) (emphasis added). 
66. The later newscasts on October 4, 1963, altered the third sentence to read 
"reportedly obscene." 403 U.S. at 34. 
67. The initial broadcast, which was similar to those that followed, stated: 
Federal District Judge Lord, will hear arguments today from two publishers 
and a distributor all seeking an injunction against Philadelphia Police Commis-
sioner Howard Leary ..• District Attorney James C. Crumlish ••• a local television 
station and a newspaper ••. ordering them to lay off the smut literature racket. 
The girlie-book peddlers say the police crackdown and continued reference to 
their borderline literature as smut or filth is hurting their business. Judge Lord 
refused to issue a temporary injunction when he was first approached. Today he'll 
decide the issue. It will set a precedent ••• and if the injunction is not granted 
••• it could signal an even more intense effort to rid the city of pornography. 
403 U.S. at 34-35. 
68. 403 U.S. at 36. 
69. 403 U.S. at 36. 
70. 403 U.S. at 36. 
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New York Times andBtttts did not apply to this case because Rosen-
bloom was not a public figure.71 Judge Lord explicitly recognized 
that a matter of public interest was involved, but declined to afford 
WIP the broader constitutional privilege based upon "public in-
terest" since Rosenbloom had no real access to means of rebuttal.72 
The court of appeals reversed, holding that the actual malice test of 
New York Times was applicable to short newscasts concerning "hot 
news"73 and that WIP's conduct did not exhibit the requisite mal-
ice.74 
The United States Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals, 
with three Justices dissenting. Justice Brennan, joined by the Chief 
Justice and Justice Blackmun, held that when a matter of public or 
general concern is published, a private individual may recover for an 
alleged libel only if he can prove the publication was made with 
knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it 
was false.75 Justice Black concurred, but maintained his view that 
the first amendment does not permit recovery in libel suits even 
when the news media publishes a matter of public concern with 
knowledge that it was false.76 Justice White also concurred, arguing 
that when there is a report or comment upon the official actions of 
public servants, a private individual connected with that official 
action may recover for an alleged libel-no matter how private an 
area of his life is exposed-only upon proof of actual malice in the 
New York Times sense.77 Justice Harlan dissented. He would require 
that there be allegation and proof of actual damage,78 that the plain-
tiff prove the defendant at least negligent in publishing the mat-
ter, 79 and that recovery be limited to any actual damage that was 
foreseeable upon publication.80 Additionally, if the private in-
dividual could prove malice in the New York Times sense, then he 
could recover punitive damages provided they bore a reasonable and 
purposeful relationship to the harm done.81 Justice Marshall, joined 
71. 289 F. Supp. 737 (E.D. Pa. 1968). 
72. 289 F. Supp. at 742. 
73. 415 F.2d 892, 895-96 (3d Cir. 1969). 
74. 415 F.2d at 898. 
75. 403 U.S. at 44. 
76. 403 U.S. at 57. See also note 39 supra. 
77. 403 U.S. at 62. Justice White specifically mentioned the full report of an arrest 
as being a report of official action. Presumably, a report on the proceedings before a 
federal district judge is likewise a report of official actions of a public servant, 
78. 403 U.S. at 64. 
79. 403 U.S. at 64. While Justice Harlan felt that negligence is a sufficient standard 
to meet constitutional requirements, he wanted to leave the states free to adopt a 
stricter standard. 
80. 403 U.S. at 68. 
81. 403 U.S. at 77. 
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by Justice Stewart, also dissented; they would require allegation and 
proof of actual damage and proof of at least negligence before the 
private individual could recover, but would in no circumstances al-
low recovery of punitive damages.82 Justice Douglas did not partici-
pate in the consideration or decision of the case.83 
Clearly, no single criterion for ascertaining when the mass media 
should be liable is subscribed to by a majority of the Court. Hence, 
the question of what standard lower courts should follow after Rosen-
bloom is not foreclosed. Only three Justices voted to use the New 
York Times standard for all matters of public interest.84 Justice Black 
continued to urge an absolute privilege for the media in publishing 
matters of public concern, a protection for the media at least as 
broad as Justice Brennan's. But Justice White cannot be viewed as 
supporting a standard that would deny recovery in every case that 
the Brennan standard would. For example, had Bon Air Hotel, Inc. 
v. Time, lnc.85 reached the Supreme Court, Justice White would not 
have concurred with those Justices granting protection to publication 
of a matter of public interest since there was no official action of a 
public servant involved.86 The recent change in Court personnel has 
further complicated the situation. Thus, a critical appraisal of the 
Brennan standard is even more necessary. Some considerable com-
mentary has anticipated the stand taken by Justice Brennan and has 
in fact advocated such a position,87 but these writers have not ex-
amined this standard in terms of the alternative proposals of Justices 
Harlan, Marshall, and White. 88 The remainder of this Comment will 
critically examine each of these opinions, concluding that Justice 
82. 403 U.S. at 85-86. 
83. Had Justice Douglas participated, he would presumably have taken a position 
similar to Justice Black's. See note 39 supra. 
84. Justices Brennan and Blackmun and the Chief Justice. There is, however, already 
some indication that lower courts are adopting this position. See, e.g., Time, Inc. v. 
Johnston, 448 F.2d 378 (4th Cir. 1971): Oberman v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 460 F.2d 
1381 (7th Cir. 1972); Credit Bureau of Dalton, Inc. v. CBS News, 332 F. Supp. 1291 
(N.D. Ga. 1971); Standke v. B.E. Darby & Sons, Inc., 291 Minn. 468, 193 N.W.2d 139 
(1971), appeal dismissed, 406 U.S. 902 (1972); Matus v. Triangle Publications, Inc., 445 
Pa. 384, 286 A.2d 357 (1971). 
85. 426 F.2d 858 (5th Cir. 1970). The case involved a description in the April 6, 
1965, issue of Sports Illustrated of an Augusta, Georgia, hotel which was used by many 
people each year during the Master's Golf Tournament. Plaintiff alleged that the 
description was defamatory. 
86. This assumes that Justices Brennan and Blackmun and the Chief Justice would 
find a description of this hotel a matter of public concern. 
87. See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 4; Pedrick, supra note 4; Note, 52 CORN.ELL L.Q. 419, 
supra note 4; Note, 75 YALE L.J. 642, supra note 4. Cf. T. EMERSON, supra note 4, at 
517-62. 
88. Justice Harlan's and Justice Marshall's opinions will be considered together 
since they present the same basic point of view. There are some differences between 
them which are not significant for purposes of this Comment. See note 174 infra. 
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Brennan's is superior. Justice Black's position will not be discussed 
since Rosenbloom contains no statement of his views that has not 
been commented upon elsewhere.89 
There are three major aspects to an appraisal of the Brennan 
position: first, whether the subject matter standard is clear enough 
to provide the media with sufficient guidance to enable them to 
avoid self-censorship; second, whether the requirement of malice will 
promote this same policy; and, third, assuming the problem of self-
censorship is rendered negligible, whether the Brennan standard 
fosters deleterious consequences concerning other significant social 
policies or the use of the Supreme Court's resources. 
With respect to the first inquiry, it must be noted that Justice 
Brennan explicitly left open the question of the scope of "public 
interest" for further cases.90 Not only did Rosenbloom concede that 
the publication in question concerned a matter of public interest,91 
but the Court also saw the arrest of a person for distributing allegedly 
obscene materials as clearly of public or general interest. The Court 
was not confronted with a close case demanding an articulation of 
standards.92 One might conclude, therefore, that the standard formu-
lated remains so nebulous that predictions about liability remain 
hazardous. Thus, the media may not have been given the advantages 
that the decision intended to convey. 
This objection would be more persuasive were it not for the siz-
able body of cases, decided both before and after Rosenbloom, that 
have employed the concept of a matter of public concern to reach 
decisions in two different types of libel cases: (1) those cases dealing 
with an alleged libel of a private individual that employed a public 
interest standard similar to Justice Brennan's; and (2) those cases 
that applied Butts to the alleged libel of a public figure.03 
The first group of cases has found public interest in a wide variety 
of human affairs ranging from lawsuits arising out of errant golf shots 
to the events of My Lai.94 The largest single block of cases concerned 
89. For an exposition of Justice Black's position, see T. EMERSON, supra note •1, 
at 624-26; Kalven, The New York Times Case: A Note on the "Central Meaning of 
the First Amendment", 1964 SUP. Cr. R.Ev. 191, 219-20; Kalven, supra note 4, at 284, 
292-95; Cahn, Justice Black and First Amendment 'Absolutes': A Public Interview, !17 
N.Y.U.L. R.Ev. 549 (1962). 
90. 403 U.S. at 44-45. It should be clear from the argument below, l1owcvcr, that 
Justice Brennan did provide some considerable guidance as to the scope of the term, 
See text accompanying notes 98-103 infra. 
91. 403 U.S. at 40. 
92. 403 U.S. at 44-45. 
93. Butts, it should be remembered, required for the application of the New Yorh 
Times malice test not only that the person libeled be a public figure, but also tltat 
the material published be a matter of public concern. 388 U.S. at 164 (Warren, C.J., 
concurring). 
94. Treutler v. Meredith Corp., 455 F.2d 255 (8th Cir. 1972) (an announcement of 
candidacy for the mayor of Omaha); Gospel Spreading Church v. Johnson Publishing 
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organized crime.95 Butts and the cases elaborating on it have also 
Co., 454 F.2d 1050 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (size of the estate left by an elder of a church, 
which is the beneficiary of special constitutional and statutory rights and exemptions); 
Time, Inc. v. Johnston, 448 F.2d 378 (4th Cir. 1971) (the story of how a little-known 
professional athlete was forced to quit playing basketball a decade before the article 
was published); Bon Air Hotel, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 426 F.2d 858 (5th Cir. 1970) (accom-
modations provided by an Augusta, Georgia, hotel during the Master's Golf Tourna-
ment); United Medical Laboratories, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 404 F.2d 
706 (9th Cir. 1968), cett. denied, 394 U.S. 921 (1969) (mail order clinical testing labs); 
Airlie Foundation, Inc. v. Evening Star Newspaper Co., 337 F. Supp. 421 (D.D.C. 1972) 
(Pentagon, State Department and CIA financing of a private foundation); Novel v. 
Garrison, 338 F. Supp. 977 (N.D. Ill. 1971) (investigation by Louisiana district attorney 
into plot to assassinate President Kennedy); Hensley v. Life Magazine, Time, Inc., 
336 F. Supp. 50 (N.D. Cal. 1971) (issuance of ministerial ordination credentials by 
Universal Life Church); Credit Bureau of Dalton, Inc. v. CBS News, 332 F. Supp. 1291 
(N.D. Ga. 1971) (the practices of credit bureaus); McFarland v. Hearst Corp., 332 F. 
Supp. 746 (D. Md. 1971) (a jail escape and later criminal charges related to it); 
Alexander v. Lancaster, 330 F. Supp. 341 (W.D. La. 1971) (awarding of a public contract 
and operations of a local police jury); Speake v. Tofte, 327 F. Supp. 200 (D.D.C. 1971) 
(connection of a CIA security officer with jewel theft); Spern v. Time, Inc., 324 F. Supp. 
1201 (W .D. Pa. 1971) (ordination and religious diploma mill rackets); Davis v. National 
Broadcasting Co., 320 F. Supp. 1070 (E.D. La. 1970), affd., 447 F.2d 981 (5th Cir. 1971) 
(statement that plaintiff was the person who asked a law1'er to defend the assassin of 
President Kennedy): Medina v. Time, Inc., 319 F. Supp. 398 (D. Mass. 1970), afjd., 
439 F.2d 1129 (1st Cir. 1971) (the events of My Lai); Sellers v. Time, Inc., 299 F. Supp. 
582 (E.D. Pa. 1969), affd., 423 F.2d 887 (3d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 830 (1970) 
(a law suit arising out of a stray golf shot); West v. Northern Publishing Co., 487 P.2d 
1304 (Alas. 1971) (illegal distribution of intoxicating beverages to minors); Time, Inc. 
v. Firestone, 254 S.2d 386 (Fla. App. 1971) (divorce decree of famous socialite); Farns-
worth v. Tribune Co., 43 Ill. 2d 286, 253 N.E.2d 408 (1969) (medical quackery); 
Snowden v. Pearl River Broadcasting Corp., 251 S.2d 405 (La. App. 1971) (narcotics 
and alleged narcotics abuse); Harnish v. Herald-Mail Co., 264' Md. 326, 286 A.2d 146 
(1972) (state of public housing and substandard housing); Priestley v. Hastings &: Sons 
Publishing Co., - Mass. -, 271 N.E.2d 628 (1971) (allegations of misconduct by an 
architect in building a junior high school); Standke v. B.E. Darby &: Sons, Inc., 291 
Minn. 468, 193 N.W .2d 139 (1971), appeal dismissed, 406 U.S. 902 (1972) {failure of a 
grand jury to file a report on the condition of the county's public buildings); Wash-
ington v. New York News, Inc., 37 App. Div. 2d 557, 322 N.Y.S.2d 896 (1971) {attendance 
by a bishop at a nightclub performance of a choir singer of his church); Twenty-Five 
East 40th St. Restaurant Corp. v. Forbes, Inc., ·37 App. Div. 2d 546, 322 N.Y.S.2d 408 
(1971) {quality of food served by a restaurant); Fotochrome, Inc. v. New York Herald 
Tribune, Inc., 61 Misc. 2d 226, 305 N.Y.S.2d 168 (Sup. Ct. 1969) {the financial status 
and manipulation of assets of a corporation); All Diet Foods Distribs., Inc. v. Time, 
Inc., 56 Misc. 2d 821, 290 N.Y .S.2d 445 (Sup. Ct. 1967) (health foods); Miller v. Argus 
Publishing Co., 79 Wash. 2d 816, 490 P.2d 101 (1971) (public relations and advertising 
company,presenting political candidates and issues). 
95. Miller v. News Syndicate Co., 445 F.2d 356 (2d Cir. 1971) (arrest of alleged 
heroin smugglers); Time, Inc. v. Ragano, 427 F.2d 219 (5th Cir. 1970) (photo of alleged 
Mafia leaders at table in a restaurant); Wasserman v. Time, Inc., 424 F.2d 920 (D.C. 
Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 940 (1970) (photo of alleged Mafia leaders at table in a 
restaurant); Time, Inc. v. McLaney, 406 F.2d 565 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 922 
(1969) (plaintiff's aiding election campaign of Bahamian candidate pledged to eliminate 
racketeer gambling); Cervantes v. Time, Inc., 330 F. Supp. 936 (E.D. Mo. 1971) (connec-
tion of St. Louis mayor to organized crime); Konigsberg v. Time, Inc., 312 F. Supp. 848 
(S.D.N.Y. 1970) (plaintiff alleged to have removed body from home of Congressman 
accused of Mafia connections); Blanke v. Time, Inc., 308 F. Supp. 378 (E.D. La. 1970) 
(article and photo claiming plaintiff and a man in Mafia association were discussing 
a fund to back a candidate for sheriff opposing anti-racketeer incumbent); Holmes v. 
Curtis Publishing Co., 303 F. Supp. 522 (D.S.C. 1969) {photo of plaintiff in gambling 
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found a wide variety of events to be matters of public interest.00 
Thus, there is substantial evidence that it is difficult for a matter not 
to fall within constitutional protection. This inference is further 
supported by the fact that there are only a few reported decisions that 
found matter published by the general circulation news media not 
to be of public interest.97 
casino with accompanying article on the infiltration of Bahamas gambling by the 
Mafia); Cerrito v. Time, Inc., 302 F. Supp. 1071 (N.D. Cal. 1969), affd., 449 F.2d 306 
(9th Cir. 1971) (plaintiff identified as head of a "Cosa Nostra Family" in San Jose); 
Arizona Biochemical Co. v. Hearst Corp., 302 F. Supp. 412 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) (plaintiff 
who held garbage collection franchise was alleged to have Mafia associations); Tripoli v. 
Boston Herald-Traveler Corp., - Mass.-, 268 N.E.2d 350 (1971) (plaintiff was suspect 
in Great Plymouth Mail Robbery); Cohen v. New York Herald Tribune, Inc,, 63 Misc, 
2d 87, 310 N.Y.S.2d 709 (Sup. Ct. 1970) (plaintiff bartender was witness to a gangland 
slaying). 
96. Greenbelt Cooperative Publishing Assn. v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6 (1970) (city council 
debates concerning rezoning land of a local contractor); Curtis Publishing Co, v. Butts, 
388 U.S. 130 (1967) (a betting scandal .in college football involving the athletic director 
of the University of Georgia); Associated Press v. Walker, 388 U.S. 130 (1967) (the 
behavior of a retired Army General at the University of Mississippi on the occasion of 
the enrollment of its first black student); Dacey v. Florida Bar, Inc., 427 F.2d 1292 
(5th Cir. 1970) (the legal controversy surrounding the book How To Avoid Probate); 
Goldwater v. Ginzburg, 414 F.2d 324 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1049, rehearing 
denied, 397 U.S. 978 (1970) (the mental and physical health of a candidate for president); 
Thompson v. Evening Star Newspaper Co., 394 F.2d 774 (D.C, Cir.), cert. denied, 893 
U.S. 884 (1968) (the fitness of a candidate for delegate to a national party convention); 
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 322 F. Supp. 997 (N.D. Ill. 1970) (a policeman'& killing 
of a criminal suspect and subsequent indictment for murder); Kapellas v. Kofman, 
1 Cal. 3d 20, 459 P .2d 912, 81 Cal, Rptr. 360 (1969) (the behavior of the children of a 
candidate for city council); News-Journal Co. v. Gallagher, - Del. -, 233 A.2d 166 
(1967) (a shortage of funds in the collection of rents from tenants living in property 
owned by the state); Snead v. Forbes, Inc., 2 Ill. App. 3d 22, 275 N.E.2d 746 (1971) 
(activities of a president of a large trucking company in managing the company); 
A.S. Abell Co. v. Barnes, 258 Md. 56, 265 A.2d 207 (1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 921 
(1971) (the failure to file reports required of a candidate for position of delegate to 
state constitutional convention); Perkins v. Mississippi Publishers Corp., 241 S.2d 139 
(Miss. 1970) (the presence of plaintiff's campaign poster in the midst of an arsenal of 
weapons found in the possession of an accused bank robber); Grayson v. Curtis 
Publishing Co., 72 Wash. 2d 999, 436 P .2d 756 (1968) (the behavior of a state university 
basketball coach at basketball games). 
97. In one of these cases, Stearn v. MacLean-Hunter, Ltd., 46 F.R.D. 76 (S.D.N.Y. 
1969), a magazine article represented the author of a book as personally greedy and 
immoral. Though not articulated as such by the court, this case seems to be in accord 
with one aspect of the traditional fair comment privilege, allowing comment on the 
merits of a work but not on the personal character of the author when it is irrelevant 
to criticizing the work. See Buckley v. Vidal, 327 F. Supp. 1051 (S.D.N.Y. 1971). See 
generally W. PROSSER, supra note 1, § 118, at 829. Hence, this case does not introduce 
any substantial degree of uncertainty as to the scope of the Brennan standard; it is 
consistent with a long-established common law doctrine denying protection to the type 
of statement involved. And, as noted above, it was largely from the common law fair 
comment privilege that the New York Times constitutional privilege arose, See text 
accompanying notes 21-25 supra. 
Another case is one decided after Rosenbloom: Matus v. Triangle Publications, Inc,, 
445 Pa. 384, 286 A.2d 357 (1971). This court held that a false accusation on a radio 
talk show that the plaintiff, a private citizen, had charged exorbitant prices for snow• 
plowing did not involve a matter of public interest. There is no traditional exception 
to the fair comment rule that seems to cover this situation. 'Whether such accusations 
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Further indicia of the breadth of public interest can be found in 
the expressions of Justice Brennan in Rosenbloom on the scope of 
the first amendment protection for the news media. Justice Brennan 
elaborated his views by reference to earlier Supreme Court decisions 
dealing with the Constitution's protection for the news media.98 The 
broadest expression of this protection was contained in a quotation 
from Thornhill v. Alabama:99 "'Freedom of discussion, if it would 
fulfill its historic function in this nation, must embrace all issues 
about which information is needed or appropriate to enable the 
members of society to cope with the exigencies of their period.' "100 
Time, Inc. v. Hill101 was cited for the proposition that the " 'guaran-
tees for speech and press are not the preserve of political expression 
or comment on public affairs.' "102 These guarantees extend to the 
advancement of " 'truth, science, morality, and the arts, in 
general.' "103 It would seem very difficult to find something that is not 
a matter of public interest under these guidelines. 
But Justice Brennan did indicate that there are such matters;104 
and, if this is so, there will always be the difficulty of ascertaining 
exactly where the distinction between protected and actionable ma-
terial lies. This implies some residual self-censorship, but it does not 
mean that the Brennan standard has not alleviated the media's major 
concern. The extant cases have marked out a wide variety of events 
that are matters of public interest. The media now realize that these 
types of material are insulated and can be published without liability 
for defamation, absent malice. The fact that there are other matters 
will be held by other courts to be matters of private concern remains to be seen, but 
surely such publications are not part of the usual fodder of media newscasts. 
There are also three cases involving publications of credit agencies which have 
held that the business or credit standing of a corporation was not a matter of public 
interest. Grove v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 438 F .2d 433 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 
404 U.S. 898 (1971); Kansas Electric Supply Co. v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 448 F.2d 
647 (10th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1026 (1972); Hood v. Dun & Bradstreet, 
Inc., 335 F. Supp. 170 (N.D. Ga. 1971). All three of these cases, however, relied in 
significant part on the fact that the medium involved was one that provides specialized 
information to a selec~ve, finite audience. Hence, they are of little xelevance in ascer-
taining the scope of "matter of public interest" where the material is published by 
the general circulation media. A fourth case involving publications of credit agencies 
did not xeach the issue of whether the matter published was of public interest, but 
xested its decision for the plaintiff on the lone ground that such a medium is not 
protected by New York Times and its progeny. Baird v. Dun & Bradstreet, 446 Pa. 266, 
285 A.2d 166 (1971). 
98. 403 U.S. at 40-44. 
99. 310 U.S. 88 (1941). 
100. 403 U.S. at 41, quoting 310 U.S. at 102. 
101. 385 U.S. 374 (1967). 
102. 403 U.S. at 41, quoting 385 U.S. at 388. 
103. 403 U.S. at 42, quoting Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 147 
(1967). 
104. 403 U.S. at 48. 
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not yet settled does not rob them of this certainty, and each court 
decision broadens the area of predictability and makes the ambit of 
uncertainty less significant. 
Furthermore, there have been some hints as to what lies in the 
private sphere, thus adding to the certainty fostered by the cases that 
have delineated matters of public interest. In asserting that there are 
aspects of the lives of even the most public of men that are not mat-
ters of public interest,1°6 Justice Brennan relied on Griswold v. Con-
necticut.106 This indicates that the use of contraceptives by a public 
official would be a private matter. If this is so, certainly the contra-
ceptive practices of private citizens would be in the private sphere. 
Professor Thomas Emerson, who argued Griswold before the Su-
preme Court for the accused physicians, suggests that the news media 
should not be · allowed to publish without permission items that 
touch "the inner core of intimacy."107 It has been suggested that the 
fair comment cases also provide some guidance.108 The creative 
thought being given to the problem of privacy today may shed fur-
ther light on the public-private dichotomy.109 Admittedly, however, 
a completely satisfactory picture of the private area will have to 
await further guidance from the Supreme Court. 
In attempting to draw the line between matters of public interest 
and private matters under the new event-oriented standard of Rosen-
bloom, one final point should be considered. Events are complexes 
of persons and their behavior and the activity of other natural forces. 
For example, the use of a contraceptive device is not an event; rather, 
the use of a contraceptive device by John and Lisa Smith is an event. 
What makes events matters of public concern in general depends not 
only on the behavior but also on the identity of the person behaving. 
The event of visiting England by John and Lisa Smith is not of con• 
cern to society as a whole, but it would be were Richard and Pat 
Nixon doing the visiting. Monitor Patriot and Ocala Star-Banner 
held that the event of a candidate's having committed a crime, how-
ever long ago, is of public concern.11° But what of the event of Lisa 
Smith's having shoplifted once when she was eighteen? Rosenbloom 
held that the event of Rosenbloom's (or John Smith's) being arrested 
for selling nudist magazines is a matter of public concern.111 Here 
105. 403 U.S. at 48. 
106. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
107. T. EMERSON, supra note 4, at 557. The author illustratively points to descrip• 
tions or photographs of a woman in childbirth and of sexual intercourse. 
108. W. PROSSER, supra note 1, § 118, at 822-23. 
109. See, e.g., M. ERNsr 8: A. SCHWARTZ, PRIVACY: THE RIGHT To BE LET ALONE 
(1968); A. MILLER, THE AssAULT ON PRIVACY (1971): A. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREFJJOM 
(1970); Fried, Privacy, 77 YALE L.J. 475 (1968). 
110. 401 U.S. at 277, 300. 
111. 403 U.S. at 45. 
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the identity of the person in the event is irrelevant to the character 
of the event vis-a-vis liability for libel. Selling allegedly pornographic 
books is the sort of behavior that significantly affects the common-
weal regardless of who is so behaving. But, for example, is lesbian 
lovemaking in private between hvo consenting adults the same sort 
of significant behavior? Or does it matter who is doing the loving? 
These questions have no easy answer, but they have the merit of il-
lustrating that Rosenbloom, while happily eliminating the more or 
less rigid personal categorizations of previous cases, should not lead 
to a neglect of treating events as the behavior of individual persons. 
The difficulty arising from what is encompassed by the public 
interest standard is not the only uncertainty that the news media are 
faced with by the Brennan standard. There is a second question 
that the Court must answer-whether the matter was published with 
New York Times malice. The vagueness of the original standard of 
"reckless disregard of the truth" occasioned considerable concern 
about self-censorship.112 However, the formulation of the malice 
test in St. Amant v,. Thompson113 and the decision in Time, Inc. v. 
Pape114 should provide relatively clear guidance. Some indication 
that the New York Times malice test offers sufficient protection for 
the media can be gained by examining the cases that focused 'on the 
question of New York Times malice after deciding that an item was 
a matter of public interest.115 Of these cases, thirty-nine found no 
New York Tim,es malice,116 nine are in an inconclusive position,117 
ll2. See the concurring opinion of Justice Black, joined by Justice Douglas, in 
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 293 (1964); the concurring opinion of 
Justice Goldberg in the same case, 376 U.S. at 297; the concurring opinion of Justice 
Douglas, joined by Justice Black, in Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 80-83 (1964); 
T. E~ERSON, supra note 4, at 535-40; Note, 52 CORNELL L.Q. 419, supra note 4, at 429-32; 
Note, 56 IowA L. REv. 393, supra note 4, at 400-06; Note, 55 MINN. L. REv. 299, supra 
note 4, at 312-19. 
ll3. 390 U.S. 727, 731 (1968). 
114. 401 U.S. 279 (1971). 
ll5. See notes 94-96 supra. 
116. Twenty-eight of these cases were decided favorably to the defendant by sum-
mary judgment or motion on the pleadings: Treutler v. Meredith Corp., 455 F.2d 255 
(8th Cir. 1972); Gospel Spreading Church v. Johnson Publishing Co., 454 F.2d 1050 
(D.C. Cir. 1971); Time, Inc. v. Johnston, 448 F.2d 378 (4th Cir. 1971); Miller v. News 
Syndicate Co., 445 F.2d 356 (2d Cir. 1971); Dacey v. Florida Bar, Inc., 427 F.2d 1292 
(5th Cir. 1970); Bon Air Hotel, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 426 F.2d 858 (5th Cir. 1970); Time, 
Inc. v. McLaney, 406 F.2d 565 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 922 (1969); United 
Medical Laboratories, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 404 F.2d 706 (9th Cir. 
1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 921 (1969); Thompson v. Evening Star Newspaper Co., 
394 F,2d 774 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 884 (1968); Novel v. Garrison, 338 F. 
Supp. 977 (N.D. Ill. 1971); Hensley v. Life Magazine, Time, Inc., 336 F. Supp. 50 (N.D. 
Cal. 1971); McFarland v. Hearst Corp., 332 F. Supp. 746 (D. Md. 1971); Cervantes v. 
Time, Inc., 330 F. Supp. 936 (E.D. Mo. 1971); Alexander v. Lancaster, 330 F. Supp. 341 
(W.D. La. 1971); Spern v. Time, Inc., 324 F. Supp. 1201 (W.D. Pa. 1971); Davis v. 
National Broadcasting Co., 320 F. Supp. 1070 (E.D. La. 1970), afjd., 447 F.2d 981 
(5th Cir. 1971); Medina v. Time, Inc., 319 F. Supp. 398 (D. Mass. 1970), afjd., 439 F.2d 
1129 (1st Cir. 1971); Konigsberg v. Time, Inc., 312 F. Supp. 848 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); 
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one found no malice in a defendant that published immediately after 
the reported event happened but did find malice in a separate defen-
dant that published the matter a month later,118 and three others 
found malice sufficient to allow a judgment for the plaintiff.110 
While this case survey does not include the cases involving public 
officials when the issue of New York Times malice was raised, it is 
ostensibly a representative sample of the reported cases dealing with 
Cerrito v. Time, Inc., 302 F. Supp. 1071 (N.D. Cal, 1969), afld., 449 F,2d 306 (9th Cir. 
1971); Sellers v. Time, Inc., 299 F. Supp. 582 (E.D. Pa. 1969), affd,, 423 F.2d 887 (3d 
Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 830 (1970); West v. Northern Publishing Co., 487 P.2d 
1304 (Alas. 1971); News Journal Co. v. Gallagher, - Del. -, 233 A.2d 166 (1967): 
Snead v. Forbes, Inc., 2 Ill. App. 3d 22, 275 N.E.2d 746 (1971): Standke v. B.E, Darby 
&: Sons, Inc., 291 Minn. 468, 193 N.W .2d 139 (1971), appeal dismissed, 406 U.S. 902 (1972); 
Washington v. New York News, Inc., 37 App. Div. 2d 557, 322 N.Y.S.2d 896 (1971); 
Twenty-Five East 40th St. Restaurant Corp. v. Forbes, Inc., 37 App. Div. 2d 546, 322 
N.Y.S.2d 408 (1971); Fotocbrome, Inc. v. New York Herald Tribune, Inc,, 61 Misc. 2d 
226, 305 N.Y.S.2d 168 (Sup. Ct. 1969); All Diet Food Distribs., Inc. v. Time, Inc., 
56 Misc. 2d 821, 290 N.Y.S.2d 445 (Sup. Ct. 1967). 
Four were decided by directed verdict for the defendant: Hamish v. Herald-Mail 
Co., 264 Md. 326, 286 A.2d 146 (1972); A.s. Abell Co. v. Barnes, 258 Md. 56, 265 A.2cl 
207 (1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 921 (1971); Tripoli v. Boston Herald-Traveler Corp., 
- Mass.-, 268 N.E.2d 350 (1971); Cohen v. New York Herald Tribune, Inc., 63 Misc, 
2d 87, 310 N.Y.S.2d 709 (Sup. Ct. 1970). 
Two decisions favorable to the defendant were based on judgments notwithstanding 
the verdict: Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 322 F. Supp. 997 (N.D. Ill. 1970): Perkins v. 
Mississippi Publishers Corp., 241 S.2d 139 (Miss. 1970). 
Four verdicts for the plaintiff were reversed on appeal: Greenbelt Cooperative Pub• 
lishing Assn. v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6 (1970); Associated Press v. Walker, 388 U.S. 130 (1967): 
Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 254 S.2d 386 (Fla. App. 1971); Priestley v. Hastings 8: Sons Pub-
lishing Co., - Mass.-, 271 N.E.2d 628 (1971). 
The defendant won a jury verdict in the other favorable case: Farnsworth v. Tri-
bune Co., 43 Ill. 2d 286, 253 N.E.2d 408 (1969). 
117. Two denied defendant's motion for judgment on the pleadings: Holmes v. 
Curtis Publishing Co., 303 F. Supp. 522 (D.S.C. 1969); Arizona Biocbemlcal Co. v. 
Hearst Corp., 302 F. Supp. 412 (S.D.N.Y. 1969). Three denied defendant's motion for a 
summary judgment: Credit Bureau of Dalton, Inc. v. CBS News, 332 F. Supp. 1291 
(N.D. Ga. 1971); Blanke v. Time, Inc., 308 F. Supp. 378 (E.D. La, 1970); Kapcllas v. 
Kofman, 1 Cal. 3d 20, 459 P .2d 912, 81 Cal. Rptr. 360 (1969). 
Three remanded cases for trial on the merits of the malice issue since it was not 
decided at trial: Time, Inc. v. Ragano, 427 F.2d 219 (5th Cir. 1970); Wasserman v. Time, 
Inc., 424 F.2d 920 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 940 (1970); Grayson v. Curtis Pub• 
lishing Co., 72 Wash. 2d 999, 436 P.2d 756 (1968). 
One found sufficient evidence of malice for the question of malice to go to the 
jury, but remanded for a new trial since the appellate court could not ascertain from 
the general verdict whether the jury used a permissible basis for awarding damages 
to the plaintiff: Miller v. Argus Publishing Co., 79 Wash. 2d 816, 490 P.2d 101 (1971). 
118. Speake v. Tofte, 327 F. Supp. 200 (D.D.C, 1971). 
119. Goldwater v. Ginzberg, 414 F.2d 324 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1049, 
rehearing denied, 397 U.S. 978 (1970); Airlie Foundation, Inc. v. Evening Star News• 
paper Co., 337 F. Supp. 421 (D.D.C. 1972); Snowden v. Pearl River Broadcasting Corp,, 
251 S.2d 405 (La. App. 1971). 
It should be noted that Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967), is not 
counted in this survey since the decision allowing the jury's verdict to stand in that 
case was based on four Justices who were employing Justice Harlan's "highly unreason-
able conduct" standard. Only Chief Justice Warren felt that the facts satisfied the 
Illalice test. See note 28 supra. 
August 1972] Comments 1567 
the issue of New York Times malice where a matter of public inter-
est was involved. This is perhaps a more accurate indicator of the 
present scope of the malice test than earlier decisions that dealt with 
public officials, since it involves opinions ·written after the Supreme 
Court had the opportunity to clarify how stringent the burden was 
on the plaintiff to raise a jury issue concerning malice.120 Since it _is 
apparently very difficult to demonstrate malice, the media can publish 
without undue fear of damage judgments resulting from uncertainty 
over the exact scope of the term "malice." Therefore, the malice 
test probably poses little danger of self-censorship. 
Because the Brennan standard provides this expansive protection 
for the news media, there is no doubt that to some extent it conflicts 
with the social policy underlying the tort of libel: As the constitu-
tional protection afforded the media increases, the tort policies of 
deterring libels and compensating individuals for harm to their repu-
tations are eroded. Moreover, those who would criticize the Brennan 
standard can contend that many of the justifications given for taking 
away the protection of libel laws from public officials and public 
figures are of doubtful application to private individuals. First, it 
has been suggested that since public officials are protected from lia-
bility for defamation contained in communications within the scope 
of their official duty,121 it is equitable to foreclose their opportunity 
to collect damages for defamation concerning their official conduct.122 
But the private citizen has no such previously existing protection 
from liability motivating a withdrawal of his right to collect damages 
for defamation. Second, whatever the ability of public officials and 
public figures to obtain access to the news media for purposes of re-
ply, the ability of the private individual in this regard is even more 
tenuous.123 Third, however thick-skinned public officials and public 
figures are in regard to adverse commentary-in the sense that they 
have assumed the risk of defamation-it would seem private indi-
viduals are and should be expected to be less so;124 however willing 
the public is to pass off libelous remarks about public officials and 
public figures as "politics" or "gossip," there is less reason to ignore 
such remarks about private individuals.125 
The first argument for not extending the New York Times stan-
dard to private citizens fails to see that mutuality is built into the 
Brennan standard. Each citizen stands in a symmetrical relation to 
120. For a sampling of these earlier cases see Annot., 20 A.L.R.3d 988 (1968). 
121. E.g., Barr v. Mateo, 360 U.S. 564 (1959). 
122. Arkin &: Granquist, The Presumption of General Damages in the Law of Con-
stitutional Libel, 68 CoLuM. L. R.Ev. 1482, 1489 (1968). 
123, Nimmer, supra note 4, at 954:55; Note, The End of the Line: Rosenbloom 'U. 
Metrpmedia, 31 U. Prrr. L. R.Ev. 734, 739-41 (1970). 
124. Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 408-09 (1967) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
125. Arkin&: Granquist, supra note 122, at 1488. 
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each other citizen regarding matters of public interest. Absent malice, 
no person is liable to another for publishing such matters, and neither 
one can collect damages from the other. As to the second argument, 
Justice Brennan concluded that 
the unproved, and highly improbable generalization that an as yet 
undefined class of "public figures" involved in matters of public 
concern will be better able to respond through the media than 
private individuals also involved in such matters seems too insub-
stantial a reed on which to rest a constitutional distinction.120 
It could be contended that this reply suggests not that the constitu-
tional privilege should be extended to private individuals, but rather 
that there was insufficient ground for the adoption of the privilege 
in New York Times and Butts. But this ground-access to the media 
to reply-was not central to the rationale for the constitutional privi-
lege. The critical justification for the New York Times privilege was 
simply "to give effect to the [First] Amendment's function to encour-
age ventilation of public issues."127 Moreover, Justice Brennan sug-
gested that the proper solution for any lack of access on the part of 
both public officials and private citizens is not the granting of the 
right to sue for defamation, but rather the passage of state laws 
requiring a retraction of false statements and granting a right to the 
offended party to reply.12s 
Regarding the third argument, Justice Brennan indicated that 
the view that public officials and public figures assume the risk of 
defamation by voluntarily placing themselves in the public eye is 
not sufficiently subtle. Each person as a concomitant of living in so-
ciety takes the risk of exposing himself to others in varying degrees. 
Moreover, a public official or public figure does not assume the risk 
of public exposure of all aspects of his life.129 Finally, whatever the 
strength of this assumption of risk argument, one should not lose 
sight of the most fundamental consideration: the discussion of public 
issues should not be hampered simply because the issue involves a 
private citizen.130 
Clearly, Justice Brennan believes that the current risk of defama• 
tion of private citizens is a risk of abuse that must be tolerated. In 
criticizing this position one might claim that Justice Brennan under-
estimates the degree of risk to reputation involved with a press less 
fettered by the threat of legal action. But the language of his opinion 
belies this. He spoke of the media as occasionally grossly abusing its 
126. 403 U.S. at 46-47. 
127. 403 U.S. at 46. 
128. 403 U.S. at 47. See generally Barron, Access to the Press-A New First A.mend• 
ment Right, 80 HARV. L. REv. 1641 (1967), 
129. 403 U.S. at 48. 
130. 403 U.S. at 47-48. 
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freedom,131 and cited James Madison as admitting that the press' lib-
erty has at times degenerated into licentiousness.132 There is no 
underestimation of the risk here. One could also argue that Justice 
Brennan has simply made an erroneous value judgment in balancing 
the competing interests of protecting reputation and promoting dis-
cussion of matters of public interest. An adequate reply to this argu-
ment rests upon two hypotheses: (1) without the Brennan standard, 
the media will be deterred from printing matters of public interest; 
and (2) with the Brennan standard, the media will not let loose. a 
torrent of defamation since they will be deterred from publishing 
libels by factors other than damage judgments. 
The first proposition cannot be demonstrated analytically, and 
there is no empirical evidence available on just what sort of self-
censorship the media do engage in; but it can be shown that the first 
position is a reasonable hypothesis. Without the extension of con-
stitutional protection to all matters of public interest, publishing 
matters involving private citizens could be very costly to the media. 
The lower court verdict in Rosenbloom originally totalled 750,000 
dollars, and even after remittitur it was 275,000 dollars.133 This is a 
sizable cost of doing business even before litigation expenses are 
added. Therefore, one could well be wary of publishing some items 
even though they are clearly of public interest. The Brennan stan-
dard frees the publisher from anxiety about these costs and thus 
promotes the dissemination of a wider range of matters of general 
concern to the public.134 
Regarding the second proposition, Emerson suggests the follow-
ing factors as relevant: 
Traditions, attitudes, and general rules of political conduct are far 
more important controls. The fear of opening a credibility gap and 
thereby lessening one's influence, holds some participants in check. 
Institutional pressures in large organizations, including some of the 
press, have a similar effect.135 
Furthermore, the development of professional organizations for 
journalists at the national, state, and local level is significant since 
these groups discuss, and thereby foster, professional responsi-
bility.136 The role of the American Society of Newspaper Editors, 
131. 403 U.S. at 51. 
132. 403 U.S. at 51, citing 6 WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON, 1790-1802, at 336 (G. Hunt 
ed. 1906). 
133, 403 U.S. at 40. 
134. That the Brennan position does this better than that of Justice Marshall will 
be argued below. See text accompanying notes 178-90 infra. 
135. T. EMERSON, supra note 4, at 538. 
136. Franklin, A Constitutional Problem in Privacy Protection, Legal Inhibitions on 
Reporting of Fact, 16 STAN. L. RF.v. 107, 146-48 (1963). Though Professor Franklin's 
article deals with the question of invasion of privacy by newspaper reporting, the close 
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founded in 1922, is also noteworthy. This organization has adopted 
The Canons of Journalism,137 which serve as general guidelines for 
journalists but have no sanctions for their violation.138 Finally, it is 
significant that journalists are receiving professional training in 
schools of journalism. This elevation of journalism to a professional 
status carries with it a concomitant sense of responsibility.139 Though 
one cannot be completely sanguine about journalists' ability to regu-
late themselves, self-regulation is at least a plausible alternative to 
damage actions as a deterrent to irresponsibly defamatory articles.140 
Professional journalists have also seen this as an alternative. 
Harold Nelson, Director of the School of Journalism of the Univer-
sity of Wisconsin, does not view the New York Times case as unleash-
ing a torrent of untruth about public men.141 Two factors are critical 
here: (1) the decreasing need to hit the streets fast with poorly docu-
mented stories caused by the decline in competition among news-
papers,142 and (2) the growing sense of professionalism taught both 
in the schools and on the job.143 Moreover, these factors will be bol-
stered by the realization that damages may still be recovered if the 
publisher knew the item was false or entertained serious doubts 
about its veracity before publication. Thus, conflict between the 
Brennan standard and the social policies underlying the tort of libel 
may not be very substantial. 
But these policies are not the only ones that potentially conflict 
with an expansive, event-oriented privilege. Justice Marshall offered 
two criticisms of the Brennan standard, both of which concern the 
role of the courts: the necessity of reviewing de novo the evidentiary 
basis for the lower court decision will involve the Supreme Court 
in the use of an inordinate amount of its time in supervising defama-
tion litigation throughout the country;144 and, in addition, judicial 
determination of what is a matter of public interest poses the pos-
sibility of court censorship of the media.140 The former criticism is 
analogy between the subject matter of libel and privacy makes his remarks pertinent 
to the media's responsibility in avoiding libelous publication. 
137. Id. at 146 n.152. 
138. Id. at 108 n.10. 
139. Id. at 147. Cf. Yoakam &: Farrar, The Times Libel Case and Communications 
Law, 42 JOURNALISM Q. 661-64 (1965). 
140. Franklin, supra note 136, at 148. 
141. Nelson, Newsmen and the Times Doctrine, 12 VILL. L. REv. 788, 749-50 (1967). 
142. Id. at 749. Some empirical support for this proposition may be found in Rarick 
&: Hartman, The Effects of Competition on One Daily Newspaper's Content, 43 JOUR• 
NALISM Q. 459-63 (1966), 
143. Nelson, supra note 141, at 750, Other commentators have also noted this growth 
in professionalism. See, e.g., McLeod &: Hawley, Professionalization Among Newsmen, 
41 JOURNALISM Q. 529-38 (1964); Rivers, The Correspondents After 25 Years, 1962 CoLuM, 
JOURNALISM REv. 4-10. 
144. 403 U.S. at 81. 
145. 403 U.S. at 79. 
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telling only if, first, the standard proposed by Justice Brennan re-
quires the Supreme Court in most cases to balance the interests in-
volved; and, second, there is another standard possessing the desirable 
characteristics of the Brennan position that would not involve the 
Court in a similar use of time. 
Each of these propositions is dubious. For a while, the Court will 
probably be involved with a number of libel cases. Even though there 
is already a sizable body of case law articulating what is a matter of 
public interest, it is nonetheless very likely that the issue of what is 
encompassed by this concept will be further discussed by the Supreme 
Court, since Rosenbloom did not present facts requiring articulation 
of a precise standard for determining matters of public interest.146 
But that this issue will continue to be raised by every libel suit in 
the foreseeable future in such a way that the Court will be required 
to grant certiorari is quite another proposition. The more likely 
scenario is that traced out by cases elucidating the content of the 
term "public official" as used in New York Times.147 The issue of 
who is a public official was raised very clearly in Rosenblatt v. Baer,148 
wherein a standard was developed that has not since required the 
constant scrutiny of the Court.149 In fact, there have been no cases 
decided by the Supreme Court since Rosenblatt that have raised, in 
any significant manner, the issue of whether the plaintiff was a public 
official, although there have been several cases dealing with the ques-
tion in the lower federal courts and the state courts.150 Thus, it is 
likely that once the question of the scope of the term "matter of pub-
lic interest" is put to the Supreme Court and answered with a reason-
ably clear set of guidelines, the Court should not have to spend very 
much time discussing the further frontiers of the term.151 
The criticism that Justice Brennan's standard will make the courts 
censors of the media is theoretically the most significant objection 
146. 403 U.S. at 44-45. 
147. New York Times did not define the scope of the term "public official." 376 U.S. 
at 283 n.23. 
148. 383 U.S. 75 (1966). 
149. 383 U.S. at 85-86 & n.13. 
150. See, e.g., Eadie v. Pole, 91 N.J. Super. 504, 221 A.2d 547 (App. Div. 1966) (muni-
cipal assessor); Schneph v. New York Post Corp., 16 N.Y.2d 1011, 213 N.E.2d 309, 265 
N.Y.S.2d 897 (1965) (municipal civil service attorney). See also Annot., 19 A.L.R.3d 1361, 
1373-79 (1968). 
151. It could be argued that the term "matter of public interest" is more nebulous 
and difficult to define than the term "public official," and therefore the Supreme Court 
will not be able to divest itself of a stream of libel litigation. There is some merit to 
this contention, but it is not clearly persuasive. It may be patent that it is more diffi-
cult to define "matter of public interest" than to define "public official," but it is not 
patent that this increased difficulty is severe enough to require constant Supreme Court 
scrutiny of libel litigation. 
Discussion of the use of the Supreme Court's time by employing another standard 
will be postponed until the examination of Justice Marshall's standard below. See text 
accompanying notes 191-95 infra. 
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ta that standard.152 The Court surely should not have the power to 
tell the media what they may or may not publish. Practically speak-
ing, however, there is little indication that courts are prone to restrict 
what the media may publish, for the cases that have so far employed 
the standard have all but unanimously found the material published 
by the general circulation media to be of public interest.11i3 
Furthermore, the theoretical ground of this criticism is also open 
to question. It must be conceded that there is some possibility of 
judicial censorship under the Brennan standard. But even so staunch 
a defender of unlimited first amendment freedoms as Emerson recog-
nizes that there is a sphere of each person's life that is to be protected 
from intrusion by the media.154 If this is so, who is to decide whether 
a particular matter comes within such a private sphere? Presumably, 
this role must be filled by the courts, for this is one of their tradi-
tional functions: determining the reach of constitutional protections 
when two or more persons are involved in actual controversy. In this 
situation, the defamed seeks protection of his reputation, while the 
media seek protection of their first amendment rights of free speech. 
The courts are, and must be, the ultimate arbiters of disputes in-
volving a clash of values either of which is protected by the Constitu-
152. Speaking of the "newsworthiness" privilege with respect to the right to privacy, 
Emerson states: 
Nor can it be said that the concept of "newsworthiness" is acceptable from a First 
Amendment point of view. If it is construed in the sense of matter suitable for 
use by the press, then the government is given the power to curtail speech on the 
vague ground that it does not consider the material fit for publication. In fact, no 
matter how the term is construed, a classification that bases the right to First 
Amendment protection on some estimate of how much general interest there is in 
the communication is surely in conflict with the whole idea of the First Amend-
ment. 
T. EMERSON, supra note 4, at 554. 
These words are equally applicable to the privilege of comment on matters of pub-
lic interest because the two privileges are closely analogous. The privilege of news-
worthiness is a defense to the claim of invasion of privacy by publication of true state-
ments regarding a person's life. It applies if the true statement is a matter of public 
interest. Therefore, in determining the applicability of each privilege the court must 
determine whether or not the statement published is a matter of public interest, See 
generally Kalven, Privacy in Tort Law-Were Warren and Brandeis Wrong?, 31 LAW 
& CoNTEMP. PROB. 326 (1966); Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAI.IF. L. REv. 383 (1960): Wade, 
Defamation and the Right of Privacy, 15 VAND. L. REv. 1093 (1962). This privilege of 
newsworthiness has been raised to the level of a constitutional privilege in Time, Inc. 
v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967). It is possible that right of privacy cases could provide some 
further guidance concerning what is a matter of public interest, but any reliance on 
these cases should be be guarded since right of privacy cases involve a legal right 
separate from that involved in libel cases, 385 U.S. at 384 n.9. This difference in the 
causes of action may well mean that the factual settings for the assertion of the right 
of privacy will be substantially unlike the factual settings in libel cases, For a repre-
sentative group of right to privacy cases that found the statements published to be of 
public interest, see 385 U.S. at 383 n.7. 
153. See notes 94-96 supra and accompanying text. 
154. T. EMERSON, supra note 4, at 556. The test he proposes for delineating this 
sphere is "communication which touches the inner core of intimacy," See note 107 
supra and accompanying text. 
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tion. And libel cases present just such an inescapable clash unless 
one is willing to hold the view that even so narrow an area of protec-
tion as that sketched out by Emerson must be eliminated if the free-
dom necessary for the media to perform their first amendment 
function is to be obtained. Given the value of having such a protected 
area,166 the dangers of some minimal court censorship seem an ac-
ceptable risk unless there is some better way to promote discussion of 
public issues without putting the courts in a censorship role. 
There is a final difficulty with the Brennan test: how should it be 
related to future cases involving public figures and public officials? 
Public figure cases pose no problem regarding the public interest 
aspect of the Brennan standard because Butts required that a matter 
of public interest be present.166 However, there is a problem as to 
whether the standard of highly unreasonable conduct, formulated 
by Justice Harlan in Butts, or the malice standard of New York 
Times now governs the liability of the media regarding public fig-
ures. It is a reasonable inference that the malice test is required by 
Butts standing alone, for there were in fact five Justices subscribing 
to that standard and only four to Harlan's standard.167 In any event, 
because the Brennan standard focuses on the published matter's char-
acter, it would require the malice test in all cases involving matters 
of public interest, including those dealing with public figures. More-
over, the virtue of a single, consistently applicable rule bolsters this 
conclusion. 
Litigation involving alleged defamations of public officials poses 
a different problem. The original formulation in New York Times 
required that the matter published be a criticism of the "official con-
duct" of a public official.158 Garrison v. Louisiana169 found this for-
mulation to be too narrow, and afforded constitutional protection 
to "anything which might touch on an official's fitness for office."160 
Monitor Patriot made this same expansive formula the standard for 
candidates for office.161 Yet, it is clear that the public interest standard 
also encompasses cases involving public officials and candidates. In-
deed, as stated above, what is and what is not a matter of public 
interest may well depend upon the plaintiff's societal role:162 certain 
disclosures may be in the public realm when they concern a candi-
date or public official, but not when they concern a private citizen.163 
155. See authorities cited in note 109 supra. 
156. 388 U.S. at 162 (Warren, C.J., concurring). 
157. See note 28 supra. 
158. 376 U.S. at 283. 
159. 379 U.S. 64 (1964). 
160. 379 U.S. at 76-77. 
161. 401 U.S. at 274. 
162. See text accompanying notes 110-11 supra. 
163. There is a strong line of cases that suggest that disclosure of a prior criminal 
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This does not mean that the verbal formulas of Garrison and Mon-
itor Patriot should be abandoned. They are particularizations of the 
public interest standard well fashioned to the type of event they 
consider, and their limitation to candidates and public officials should 
avoid undue confusion with respect to their applicability. 
Thus, the Brennan standard, considered in its own right, is a 
sensible accommodation of the interests involved in the clash of first 
amendment rights with state libel laws; but its acceptability also 
depends on whether better alternatives exist. The position of Justices 
Black and Douglas has been adequately examined in the litera-
ture.164 However, the novel views of Justices White, Marshall, and 
Harlan have not been adequately discussed and, therefore, merit 
examination. 
Justice White set forth his own viewpoint in Rosenbloom be-
cause he felt that the other opinions disposed of more constitutional 
issues and displaced more state libel law than was necessary to reach 
a decision.165 The Brennan, Marshall and Harlan opinions represent 
for Justice White a considerable shifting of the burden of proof from 
the defendant to the plaintiff without any evidence that such was 
required by actual media self-censorship.166 As noted above,167 Justice 
White was correct in asserting that there is not available supportive 
empirical data for this shift. But the mere absence of sufficient empir-
ical data regarding self-censorship does not imply that Justice White's 
standard is superior. The arguments that, absent the Brennan stan-
dard, such self-censorship would be the likely choice of a rational 
publisher108 and that the Brennan standard is consistent with the 
objectives of the first amendment169 demand that the validity of an 
alternative position be affirmatively demonstrated before that alterna-
tive is adopted. Justice White's standard-by granting a privilege 
to report all matters, however private, connected with the official 
actions of public servants-is indeed no less venturesome than 
Justice Brennan's. It would allow the press access to records of 
juvenile court proceedings although there is considerable reason 
record is a violation of the right to privacy of a private person, See, e.g., Melvin v. 
Reid, 112 Cal. App. 285, 297 P. 91 (1931); Briscoe v. Reader's Digest Assn., 4 Cal. 3d 
529, 483 P .2d 34, 93 Cal. Rptr. 866 (1971). Additionally, it has been argued that after 
a certain number of years a prior arrest record should be expunged. See, e.g., Note, 
Constitutional Law-Right of Police To Retain Arrest Records, 49 N.C. L. R.Ev, 509 
(1971). Both of these developments indicate that an allegation of criminal conduct that 
took place in the distant past may not be a matter of public interest when a private 
citizen is involved. 
164. See note 89 supra. 
165. 403 U.S. at 59. 
166, 403 U.S. at 58-59. 
167. See text accompanying notes 133-34 supra. 
168. Id. 
169. See text accompanying note 175 infra. 
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to keep such proceedings confidential.170 It would also permit the 
press to print the names of rape victims-a practice that has little 
to recommend it.171 Moreover, it would appear to allow the media 
to report that a person arrested for running a red light is a homo-
sexual.172 While not protecting the media when the quality of 
consumer goods or the qualifications of a medical testing unit are 
involved,173 Justice White's standard would allow for a sizable 
alteration of current libel law without any demonstration that this is 
necessary to protect first amendment freedoms. 
Justice Marshall proposed what seems on initial reading to be a 
viable alternative to the Brennan standard. His standard requires the 
Court to ascertain whether there was allegation and proof of actual 
damage and whether there was proof of at least negligence before the 
private-citizen plaintiff in a libel suit is allowed to recover.174 
The logical connection between any standard advocated and the 
arguments supporting it must be considered in order to assess that 
standard. The theoretical rationale of the Brennan standard is well 
documented:175 the central idea of the supportive literature is that a 
self-governing people has a right to be informed about public mat-
ters. The Brennan standard responds to this idea directly by dis-
tinguishing public from private matters and protecting publication 
of the former. The logical connection between the rationale and the 
standard is clear and unambiguous, whatever the alleged practical 
problems of the Brennan standard. But such is not necessarily the 
case with Justice Marshall's opinion. He justified his standard on two 
grounds: first, it will compensate the victims of defamation for their 
real injuries, and, second, it will eliminate self-censorship by the 
media.176 A careful examination of the first rationale indicates that 
Justice Marshall's standard would not provide such compensation. 
170. 403 U.S. at 45 n.13 (Brennan, J.). 
171. This is against the statutory policy of several states, as noted in Franklin, supra 
note 136, at 121-22. The Franklin article also contains an extended discussion of the 
constitutionality of such statutes. Id. at 121-38. 
172. An anest is surely an official action of a public servant, and Justice White put 
no limit on the content of reports about persons connected with such official actions. 
173. All Diet Foods Distribs., Inc. v. Time, Inc., 56 Misc. 2d 821, 290 N.Y.S.2d 445 
(Sup. Ct. 1967); United Medical Laboratories, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 
404 F.2d 706 (9th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 921 (1969). Neither of these cases 
involved the official actions of a public servant. 
174. 403 U.S. at 86-87 (1971). The variation which Justice Harlan's opinion works 
on this test will be considered below to ascertain whether the Harlan additions meet 
the criticisms posed. Justice Harlan's test would add three further questions to the 
Court's inquiry concerning the constitutional requirements: (1) if actual damage has 
been suffered, was this damage foreseeable at the time of publication? (2) was the 
publication made with actual malice so as to allow the imposition of punitive damages? 
and (3) did the punitive damages assessed by the jury bear a reasonable and purposeful 
relation to the harm done? 
175. See authorities cited in note 87 supra. 
176. 403 U.S. at 84. 
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For Justice Marshall's standard to compensate completely the vic-
tims of defamation for their real injuries, all of the harm actually 
suffered by them must be provable in court. Yet, the weight of au-
thority is that not all of the results of defamation are so demon-
strable.177 The effects of defamation are subtle. Thus, the presump-
tion of general damages is necessary in order to compensate those 
who are actually harmed by defamation. Justice Marshall did not 
even address himself to the question of the validity of this tradi-
tional presumption, let alone argue persuasively against it. Absent 
such consideration, there would appear to be a wide gap between 
the standard he proposes and his rationale for it. 
Justice Marshall devoted a great deal more time to his second 
justification, the elimination of self-censorship. He is in essential 
agreement with Justice Brennan that the critical danger to the fun-
damental first amendment values posed by state libel laws is that of 
self-censorship induced by the fear of numerous large judgments.178 
Justice Marshall, however, felt that it is the size of these judgments, 
stemming from jury awards of punitive as well as general damages, 
that is the primary evil.179 Thus, if damages are limited to those 
actually proved by a preponderance of evidence, the jury's discretion 
will be greatly contracted and the dollar amounts of judgments 
against the media will be kept to a minimum. However, self-
censorship will be eliminated only if it is apparent to the media 
that sizable judgments will not result from their publishing the 
matter in question, and this depends at least in part on the types 
of harm that are actionable. Justice Marshall noted that "damages 
can be awarded for more than direct pecuniary loss but they must 
be related to some proved harm."180 That the range of "proved 
harm" is broad can be ascertained by Justice Marshall's citation to 
an article by Judge Skelly Wright181 in which Judge Wright stated 
that "harm should include any injury, from loss of associates and 
friends or mental distress to pecuniary or temporal damage.''182 
Hence, under Justice Marshall's standard, limitations on judgments 
probably do not come from restricting the type of harm for which 
compensation is allowed, but rather from two possible sources: first, 
the elimination of nuisance suits by people who know they have not 
been harmed by the alleged libel but want to obtain retribution 
against the media and can do so under the cloak of general damages; 
177. W. PROSSER, supra note 1, § 112, at 765. 
178. 403 U.S. at 82. 
179. 403 U.S. at 82-84. 
180. 403 U.S. at 86. 
181. Wright, Defamation, Privacy, and the Public's Right To Know: A National 
Problem and a New Approach, 46 TEXAS L. REv. 630 (1968). 
182. Id. at 648. 
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and, second, the inability of persons actually suffering harm to prove 
their total injury in court. In both cases, either the possibility of 
recovering a judgment is eliminated or the size of a judgment re-
covered is substantially reduced by Justice Marshall's standard, since 
recovery is limited to actual harm proved in court. But, as Justice 
Brennan noted, the media would still be faced with the costs of litiga-
tion in many cases.188 Surely, those genuinely harmed would con-
tinue to sue at least until it became patent that a very high standard 
of proof was being demanded. And one could argue that even some 
of those who know they have not been harmed, and yet who want 
to strike back at the media, would continue to sue either in the hope 
of achieving a settlement out of court or simply for the satisfaction 
of annoying the media that have defamed them. Hence, there would 
still probably be some media self-censorship. 
Even more significantly, with Justice Marshall's standard it would 
be most difficult to predict in advance what sort of harm any particu-
lar person would suffer and whether that person would be able to 
prove actual damage to the satisfaction of a jury. Even Justice 
Harlan's addendum to the Marshall standard, requiring that the 
harm be reasonably foreseeable at the time of publication,184 does 
not eliminate the uncertainty; Justice Harlan would allow recovery 
only when the harm caused was the sort that one could reasonably 
expect a man of ordinary sensibilities to suffer in a society "not 
especially susceptible to distress at the spector of open, uninhibited, 
robust speech.''185 Of course, if the media knew it was dealing with 
a person of unusual sensitivity, it would be liable for the unusual 
harm caused.188 Even if Justice Harlan's addendum restricts the scope 
of injuries that are recoverable,181 it does not enhance the media's 
ability to predict what damages will be demonstrable in a court of 
law. In sum, assessment of the plaintiff's chances rests on knowledge 
of his ability to amass convincing evidence. And the Marshall stan-
dard, even with the Harlan addendum, does not provide the media 
with such knowledge. 
It is possible, on the other hand, that Justice Marshall's standard, 
by restricting awards to damages actually proved, will cut down on 
the aggregate number of judgments for the defamed. Even if the 
media cannot accurately predict prior to publication whether 
183. 403 U.S. at 52•53. 
184. 403 U.S. at 68. 
185. 403 U.S. at 68. 
186. 403 U.S. at 68. 
187. And one could argue that it does not, absent some comment by defenders of 
Justice Harlan's position on the sorts of harm for which recovery would be allowed. 
The harms Judge Wright mentioned do not seem incapable of being suffered by a per-
son of ordinary sensibilities in a society tolerant of robust public discussion. 
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any particular person will be able to prove damages, they will be 
able to publish with the knowledge that statistically the chances of 
recovery have been considerably reduced. This argument possesses 
some plausibility; but the same argument can be made in favor of 
the Brennan standard. And the Brennan standard will in many 
circumstances allow the media to foresee in advance of publica-
tion whether a particular matter is one of public concern, and 
consequently protected.188 Even if the case law interpreting the 
Brennan standard is not currently sufficient for predictability, 
further decisions of the Supreme Court can enhance predictability 
by sharpening the scope of "matter of public interest." In contra-
distinction, no decision of the Court could significantly enhance the 
predictability of what damages are provable in court because this 
would depend on manifold evidentiary problems likely to be unique 
to each libel suit. Narrowing the scope of harm that is actionable or 
strengthening the burden of proof for each sort of recoverable harm 
could well mean statistically fewer and smaller judgments, but it 
would not help the media to predict in advance of publication 
whether a particular person would be able to meet this added burden. 
The Marshall standard does have the apparent advantage for the 
media that it applies to all libels, even those that do not involve a 
matter of public interest, and, therefore, would offer a zone of pro• 
tection broader in scope than that resulting from application of the 
Brennan standard. Yet, it is not clear that the media should be so 
protected when private matters are published since this would argu-
ably impinge too extensively on the right to privacy;180 additionally, 
it is far from obvious that the media would really obtain added 
protection due to the difficulties of predictability noted above. In 
any event, since the bulk of media publications involve matters of 
public interest, 190 a greater degree of predictability regarding these 
matters is more significant for the media than a questionably greater 
freedom to publish matters within the private sphere. 
Finally, Justice Marshall asserted that his standard will enhance 
the efficient use of the Supreme Court's time because it will not 
involve the Court in ad hoc balancing of the interests involved.101 
It can be argued that Justice Marshall was making two points here: 
first, that his hypothesis sets up a generally applicable test that frees 
188. The predictability is supplied by the extant case law traced out above in tl1e 
text accompanying notes 94-96 supra and by the verbal formulae discussed in the text 
accompanying notes 98-103 supra. 
189. See text accompanying notes 105-06 supra and authorities cited in note 109 
supra. 
190. See text accompanying notes 105-09 supra. Matters touching tlle "inner core of 
intimacy" arc not the staple of the news media. 
191. 403 U.S. at 86. 
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the Supreme Court from the necessity of reviewing a large number 
of libel cases; and, second, that when the Court is involved it will 
be determining essentially objective matters.192 
Justice Marshall's first claim is open to question because the 
Court might be forced to come to terms with a constitutional defini-
tion of actual damage in response to the successful allegation of novel 
sorts of injury in the lower courts. Indeed, this problem might be 
exacerbated should a state legislature declare a very broad definition 
of actual damage.193 Justice Marshall himself recognized that there 
are limits on the scope of actionable damage.194 Conceivably, a con-
stitutional definition of actual damage would require the Court to 
balance the interests of public discussion and compensation for harm 
from defamation in much the same way that the Court under the 
Brennan standard would determine whether a matter is one of public 
interest. Moreover, use of the Marshall standard would require that 
the Court determine in each case whether the evidence was sufficient 
to meet the burden of proving actual damage and negligence. This 
follows since the appealable issues would be whether actual damage 
was suffered and whether the media published the matter without 
due care. Refusal to re-examine the evidence de novo would effec-
tively bar the Court from enforcing the required standard of proof 
that is critical to the constitutional protection Justice Marshall wants 
to afford the media. 
Justice Marshall also recognized that the Court must engage in 
fact-finding.195 The pertinent question then becomes whether there 
is any radical distinction benveen the sort of inquiries Justice Mar-
shall's test would require and those involved in the Brennan 
standard. It is clear that in the former the process would not be so 
objective as Justice Marshall indicated, if he views the scope of actual 
damage as including damages for mental distress. Instead of probing 
the mind of the defendant as the Brennan standard requires, the 
Court would be required to probe the mind of the defamed plaintiff. 
Neither inquiry seems more objective than the other, and the use of 
either standard would therefore appear to involve the Court equally 
in fact-finding and supervision of libel litigation. 
The lesson of this investigation of current judicial standards for 
, applying the first amendment to state libel laws is that there are 
difficulties with any proposed balancing of these interests. The Bren-
nan standard, however, appears to be the most appropriate one, at 
least absent sound empirical data on the actual effect of any of these 
192. 403 U.S. at 86 n.ll. 
193. 403 U.S. at 53 (Brennan, J.). 
194. 403 U.S. at 86-87. 
195. 403 U.S. at 86 n.U. 
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hypotheses on the behavior of the media. The diversity of views 
among the Justices on the proper balancing 0£ interests and the re-
cent shift in Court personnel makes any prediction about what the 
Supreme Court will do next very hazardous. Nevertheless, the most 
fitting approach would be to adopt the Brennan standard and to 
elucidate further the dividing line between matters of public interest 
and those in the private sphere. 
